HOW ENGLAND'S GREATEST VICTORY LED TO ITS GREATEST DEFEAT

 

Indians Ambush British at Battle of the Monongahela — Wiki Commons

Over the course of England’s millennium of existence, they’ve gone from a collection of loosely aligned kingdoms to the largest empire the world has ever seen, followed by its slow decline. It goes without saying over the course of that thousand years the British have seen numerous victories and defeats. However, the victory that cemented their role as the preeminent power in the world was their triumph over France in the Seven Years War (1756–1763).

As a result of the peace negotiations with France and Spain, England gained control of French Canada and Spanish Florida. They also expanded their colonial positions in India, Africa, and the Caribbean. Yet, within 20 years they lost control of their 13 North American colonies that became the United States. What happened?

This isn’t exactly new ground. American history students learn that England accumulated huge debts during the war. Officials in the British government began looking to their colonies as possible revenue sources to pay those debts off. However, after decades of having a light hand in governing their colonies, these new efforts were widely seen as oppressive. Colonial smuggling to avoid the new taxes and boycotts of British goods frustrated a decade of clunky attempts to raise revenue from the American colonies. The damage caused by these boycotts did more damage to English merchants than the meager taxes collected could justify. The British attempts to tax the colonies, and the colonists’ efforts to avoid these taxes culminated in the Boston Tea Party which led to the Coercive Acts and ultimately the American Revolution. Everything in that narrative is accurate, but it doesn’t paint the whole picture.

What Are We Fighting For?

What the above narrative misses is how British actions during the war soured many colonist’s opinions about British rule even before the various post-war tax acts. The British felt justified in raising taxes on the colonies because they had fought the war on their behalf. However, this was not a view many in British North American agreed with. The reality is France posed no threat to the thirteen colonies. France never encouraged migration to the New World and only had a few small trading posts. The population in the British colonies far exceeded the French colonies, a French invasion of thirteen colonies was never a serious threat. This is especially true given that France was also fighting a land war against Prussia at the same time.

The French-Indian War (the American theater of the Seven Years War) was about control of the western territories in the Ohio valley, not control of the colonies that were already established. This wasn’t an issue that many in British America cared about. The widespread illegal trading colonists conducted with the enemy demonstrated their ambivalence towards the war. Colonial merchants selling supplies to the French bedeviled British officials throughout the war. This activity eventually led to the British use of “writs of assistance” which allowed them to search any ship or building based on a mere suspicion of illegal trade. This further alienated the colonists from the mother country.

Go West Young Man, Oh Wait

While westward expansion wasn’t a concern for most colonists, clearly some forward-looking individuals did see the potential for this vast expanse of unsettled land. Of course, they didn’t see the fact that Native Americans had already settled this land as a problem. However, King George’s 1763 proclamation prohibiting settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains was a gut punch to these colonists. I mean they had just fought this war over control of the Ohio territory and the king way off in England wouldn’t let them use it.

The king had good reason to issue the proclamation. Indians who allied themselves with the French filled this territory and didn’t recognize the treaty ending the war. There were also pockets of French settlers who didn’t want to see the British move into these lands. Opening it for settlement was a recipe for further conflict that the British couldn’t afford at the moment. Despite this, the king could issue the proclamation, but he couldn’t enforce it. Westwards, settlements continued unrestrained by the royal decree. The 1763 proclamation failed to avoid western conflict while also alienating the colonists who had supported the war and further eroded royal authority.

The Blame Game

Another source of tension, both during and after the war was the high-handed manner in which British generals treated the colonial troops. This included a general lack of recognition of the role colonial troops played in the British victory. British officials routinely criticized the provincial troops and were quick to blame them when things went poorly. It is true they didn’t perform as well as the regular troops in combat. However, the superiority in numbers the British enjoyed as a result of their colonial troops was one of the deciding factors in the war. This fact was rarely acknowledged by the British.

Perhaps more important than their performance in combat was the labor they provided. Much of this war was fought in remote, heavily wooded areas that lacked available labor. It was the effort of colonial troops that made combat in the backwoods logistically possible. In 1758 alone the colonies raised over 22,000 troops that the British used to clear roads and haul supplies. That was in addition to their role in combat.

While the British were dismissive of colonial efforts, what the residents in America saw was ineptitude on behalf of the British. Despite having colonies in America for well over a hundred years they seemed wholly incompetent at fighting in the American back country. Despite being outnumbered, the French seemed to get the better of the British in most of the engagements early in the war. It was only later in Canada with American reinforcements, and in naval battles, that the English won the war.

Beyond the view that the British were bungling the war effort, many believed that the western land holdings of royal officials was the real motivation for the war. The fact Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie was a major investor in the Ohio Company fueled this view. Dinwiddie was the most prominent royal official in America and his investments were under threat of French encroachment. The lack of any notable celebrations in America upon the British victory is evidence that many colonists didn’t feel they had won anything.

Dude, We Already Paid!

While arguing the colonies needed to pay for their share of the war, the British ignored that they already paid much. Every colony sent soldiers to fight in the war, many even resorted to a draft to fill the ranks. Initially the colonies bore the full cost of these troops. Later, the British partially reimbursed the cost. Still the colonies were on the hook for 60% of their wartime expenditures. The colonies paid these expenses with loans financed by additional taxes. So, when the British passed the Sugar Act, Stamp Act, etc., to pay for the war, it was on top of what the colonies had already paid.

The final indication of the deteriorating relations between the American colonies and the mother country was the quartering of troops. The memory of the forced quartering of British soldiers was still so raw thirty years later that its prohibition was included as the third item in the Bill of Rights. In fact, it was already against British law at the time, but that didn’t apply to the colonies. Everywhere the British army showed up the unfortunate city had to find a way to house the soldiers. This was yet another expense of the war that was borne by the colonies. Larger cities usually found commercial lodging for the army, but smaller towns often had to put soldiers in people’s homes. A few communities attempted to refuse. In those cases, the officers in charge made it clear with their bayonets it wasn’t a request they could refuse.

Conclusion

The typical textbook narrative of the lead up to the American Revolution often gives the impression that it was the tight-fisted colonials’ unwillingness to pay for their own defense that drove the colonies towards independence. Of course, they discuss taxation without representation as well, but overlooked is the already declining relations with the mother country. The facts they cite in these textbooks are accurate, yet they skew the larger picture.

The reality is the French and Indian War was a conflict the colonies didn’t want and didn’t benefit from. They paid much of the cost of the war already, both in terms of labor and money. Instead of getting a big thank you from the crown, they’d been treated like inferiors. The conflict laid bare the colonies standing as a tool for the empire rather than as equal citizens of the realm. This is where the seeds of revolution were sown.

Sources

Doyle, Andrew. “Europe and the Americas at War in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: Land, Religion and the Modern State.” Agora 50, no. 4 (2015): 54–59.

Ferling, John. “Soldiers for Virginia: Who Served in the French and Indian War?” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 94, no. 3 (July 1986): 307–28.

Morgan, Gwenda. “Virginia and the French and Indian War: A Case Study of the War’s Effects on Imperial Relations.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 81, no. 1 (January 1973): 23–48.

Richardson, John. “Imagining Military Conflict During the Seven Years’ War.” Studies in English Literature 1500–1900 48, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 585–611.

Rogers, Alan. “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During the French and Indian War.” Military Affairs 34, no. 1 (February 1970): 7–11.

Thomas, Agostini. “‘The Provincials Will Work like Giants’: British Imperialism, American Colonial Troops, and Trans-Atlantic Labor Economics During the Seven Years’ War.” Early American Studies 15, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 64–99.

Truxes, Thomas M. Defying Empire: Trading With the Enemy in Colonial New York. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2010.

Wicker, Elmus. “Colonial Monetary Standards Contrasted: Evidence from the Seven Years’ War.” The Journal of Economic History 45, no. 4 (December 1985): 869–84.